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I. INTRODUCTION
“We must act . . . to retain in and return to the community the mentally ill . . . [in
order] to restore and revitalize their lives.”1 President John F. Kennedy uttered these
words when addressing Congress on the issue of mental illness and mental
retardation.2 Following President Kennedy’s suggestion, this country has been less
than successful in returning the mentally ill to the community and revitalizing their
lives. While some people with mental illness may be seen functioning in and
contributing to society on a daily basis, in schools, the workforce and social settings,
many are without shelter or a job. While many members of the community believe
that persons who are mentally ill are being taken care of and are adequately
accommodated and protected by the law, they are not. Persons with mental illness
face stigma and severely limited opportunities for medical treatment, which might, if
successful, return them to the world that President Kennedy hoped this country
would create. Lack of access to basic mental heath care is a significant barrier.
While at first glance, the law appears to protect persons from being discriminated
against because they are disabled, the purpose of this paper is to illustrate that
significant discrimination exists in an area where protection is most needed - health
insurance. Currently, health insurance providers are permitted to severely limit or
even deny health insurance to persons for the sole reason that they have a mental
illness, have had a mental illness, or in some extreme cases, at some point believed
they had a mental illness.3 Health insurance providers are permitted to discriminate
solely on the basis of disability, while this type of discrimination by employers,
housing providers, and the government has been prohibited or strictly limited since
the dawn of the discrimination law.
One in five Americans is affected by mental illness. 4 According to the National
Institute of Mental Health (“NIMH”), approximately 22.1% of adult Americans
suffer from a mental disorder that would be diagnosable.5 Approximately 9.5% of
the U.S. population aged eighteen and over suffer from a depressive disorder
(defined by the NIMH as including major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder,
and bipolar disorder).6 An estimated 13.3% of Americans aged 18-54 suffer from an
anxiety disorder (defined by NIMH as including panic disorder, obsessive

1
Special Message to Congress on Mental Illness and Mental Retardation, 50 Pub. Papers
137 (Feb. 5, 1963).
2

See id.

3
See Patrick J. Kennedy, Why We Must End Insurance Discrimination Against Mental
Health Care, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363 (2004).
4

John V. Jacobi, Parity and Difference: The Value of Parity Legislation for the Seriously
Mentally Ill, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 185 (2003) (citing Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 46
(1999), available at http:// www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html).
5

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH (NIMH), NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF HEALTH, US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, The Numbers
Count: Mental Disorders in America, NIH Publication No. 01-4584 available at http://www.
nimh.nih.gov/publicat/numbers.cfm (last visited Jan. 6, 2005).
6

Id.
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compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and
phobias).7 Approximately 1.1% of American adults suffer from schizophrenia.8
Untreated mental illness can be devastating, and may interfere with family,
employment, and quality of life in general.9 Despite these dramatic statistics and
realities, privately insured Americans are not covered for mental health services on
the same terms as they are covered for physical health services.10 This inferior
coverage for mental disabilities severely reduces persons with mental illness ability
to access adequate and proper medical care.11 This lack of proper care further
reduces disabled persons ability to hold successful and meaningful places in our
society because of unemployment, homelessness, incarceration, and even early
death.12
Discriminatory practices by the insurance industry, such as benefit limits (caps)
on mental health services coverage, or complete lack of mental health care coverage
fuel the disparate treatment of those with mental disabilities. These discriminatory
practices have been the subject of much debate, and cases challenging those
principles have not fared well in the court system.13 These insurance practices,
which single out persons with mental illness and provide them with little or no
benefits for mental health care, violate the terms of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), and are inconsistent with other laws that seek to remedy
discrimination against the disabled, such as the Fair Housing Act.
The following sections will discuss the legislative history of disability law with
regard to how and why laws protect persons with disabilities. I will discuss the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and its legislative history. Then, I will discuss
interpretations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the arguments commonly
used for and against mental and physical illness equality in medical insurance
coverage. Next, I will provide a comparison of this interpretation with interpretation
of the Fair Housing Act. Finally I will suggest continuity and congruence
throughout disability law to promote a system that lives up to the goals of disability
protections.
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE ADA
Long before the emergence of disability law, there have been advocates for the
rights of disabled persons, and recognition of a need for policy to protect disabled
individuals.14 Significant protection for persons with disabilities first surfaced in
7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Jacobi, supra note 4, at 185.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Jennifer Mathis, The ADA’s Application to Insurance Coverage, BAZELON CENTER
FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, June 2004, available at http://www.bazelon.org/issues/
disabilityrights/ resources/insurance.htm.
14

Laura F. Rotheinstein, Reflections on Disability Discrimination Policy-25 Years, 22 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147 (2000).
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1973, seventeen years prior to the passage of the ADA in 1990.15 In 1973, sections
501, 503, and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act were passed.16 Soon after, in 1975, the
predecessor to the Individuals with Disability Education Act (“IDEA”) was passed.17
“These two federal statutes moved disability policy from a philosophy of support and
benefits to one of rights.”18
Following the Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA, federal statutes were introduced
affecting a nondiscrimination policy in voting,19 air transportation,20 and housing.21
Both the statutes regarding air transportation and housing addressed discrimination
in the private sector, which was not addressed by the Rehabilitation Act and the
IDEA.22 The Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA were also especially significant
because they demonstrated congressional response to judicial decisions, which
continued to be the cause of amendments to the statutes during 1970-1990.23
The policy of ensuring that mentally ill are returned to the community could only
be effective if incorporated into all aspects of life.24 Statutes providing protection for
students so that they will receive specialized education to prepare them for college
and/or the workplace would prove useless if employers were permitted to
discriminate against these disabled persons after graduation.25 Providing a
discrimination-free work environment would also be useless if disabled persons still
faced barriers in transportation and social interactions, such as eating at restaurants.26
This being recognized, ADA was passed in 1990 to ensure full participation in
society by individuals with disabilities.27
15

Id.

16

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1994).

17

20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994).

18

Rotheinstein, supra note 14, at 148.

19

The Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)
(providing for accessible voting places for federal elections).
20
The Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (1994) (subjecting airlines to
nondiscrimination on the basis of disability mandates, was passed in response to the Supreme
Court decision in Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597 (1986),
which held that indirect assistance to airlines does not subject them to Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act).
21

The Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994) (passed in
part as a response to the Supreme Court decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.
Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), a case in which the denial of a special use permit for a group home
for disabled individuals was struck down as unconstitutional. The need to have a statutory,
rather than a constitutional basis, to challenge housing discrimination led to the FHAA).
22

Rotheinstein, supra note 14, at 148-49.

23

Id. at 147-48.

24

Id. at 149.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 149-50.
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The ADA was enacted “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”28 The
ADA addresses employment, public services, public accommodations,
telecommunication, and various miscellaneous areas, one of which is health
insurance.29
III. THE ADA AND HEALTH INSURANCE
Over the last five years, the Supreme Court has been somewhat successful in
“disabling” the ADA. From 1999 when the Court adopted a narrow understanding
of the class protected by the ADA,30 to 2001, when the Court held that the ADA’s
employment title was not valid legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,31 the protections for the disabled have been narrowed. The narrowing
effect continued in 2001-2002 (the “Disabilities Act Term”)32 when an ADA
plaintiff’s claim failed against the Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretations of the
ADA.33 Critics of the Supreme Court’s analysis of both the ADA and other disability
laws have argued that the Supreme Court simply does not understand that disability
rights are civil rights, and that the ADA is a civil rights law.34 If the ADA were
widely considered to be a civil rights law, greater deference would be afforded to it.
However, unlike discrimination laws based on race or sex, the Court seems to view
disability discrimination law as a product of pity for the less fortunate.35 Not only is
this view a type of discrimination the disabled wish to avoid, but also it has been said
that it is the very reason the ADA has been uniquely limited as compared to other
civil rights laws.36
One area in which the Court has been successful in limiting disability
discrimination protection is in the field of health insurance.37 The Court Justices
have limited the ADA’s protections through their interpretation of the statute, prior
case law, policy, and arguably, because their personal prejudices against disabled

28

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2004).

29

See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2004) (on employment);
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2004) (on public accommodations);
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2004) (containing the “safe harbor”
provision).
30
See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv. Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
31

See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).

32

See Charles Lane, O’ Conner Criticizes Disabilities Law as Too Vague, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15, 2002, at A2 (referring to Justice O’Conner’s reference to “Disability Term”).
33

Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
Rational Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923 (2004).
34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 924.

37

Mathis, supra note 13.
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persons.38 To understand the unique limitations placed, it is useful first to examine
the text of the ADA and the analytical framework used by the court in the area of
health insurance for all disabled persons.
A. Textual Analysis of the ADA
Since the enactment of the ADA, there has been a great deal of litigation
surrounding its application to health insurance.39 Specifically, litigation has focused
on whether the ADA prohibits health insurers from discriminating in the types of
coverage offered to persons with particular disabilities.40 The section of the ADA
addressing insurance is unclear at best. Consequently, courts have been required to
interpret the language and intent of the statute, and in doing so, have significantly
narrowed the ADA’s protections by allowing disparity between the protections
offered to the physically disabled versus the mentally disabled.41
Though the ADA has achieved significant progress for some individuals with
disabilities, significant additional progress is needed.42 The main purpose of the
ADA was to prohibit discrimination against disabled persons in employment, public
services, and places of public accommodation.43 While its enactment has provided
significant protections for persons with disabilities, persons with mental disabilities
still lack significant protection from discrimination in health insurance.44 Titles
addressing insurance in some form are Title I (employment) and Title III (public
accommodations). And most directly relating to insurance is the “safe harbor”
provision of Title V.45 This section will give an overview of the ADA with respect
to health insurance.
1. Title I
Health insurance benefits currently offered by many employers seem to violate
Title I of the ADA on its face.46 Most health insurance plans offered by insurers and
employers provide significantly less benefits to the mentally disabled as compared
with the physically disabled.47

38

See generally Bagenstos, supra note 33.

39

Mathis, supra note 13.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do Before Hardship Turns Undue?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV.
1311 (1991) (noting that the ADA has been called the “Emancipation Proclamation” for
individuals with disabilities).
43

H.R. REP. NO. 101-336 pt. 2 (1990) (reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 303, 419-21).

44

Stuhlbarg, supra note 42.

45

See 42 U.S.C. § 12112; 42 U.S.C. § 12182; 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).

46

See 42 U.S.C. §12112.

47

Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585,
589 (2003).
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Title I limits employers’ ability to discriminate against disabled persons in hiring
and firing decisions and obliges employers to provide reasonable accommodations
for disabled individuals.48 Title I also prohibits “limiting, segregating, or classifying
a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status
of such applicant or employee because of [their] disability . . . .” The statute also
specifically prohibits employers from “participating in a contractual or other
arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting . . . . a qualified
applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this title .
. . .”49 This “includes a relationship with an organization providing fringe benefits to
an employee.”50 Employer provided health insurance is a fringe benefit of
employment, therefore, the ADA should prohibit employers from contracting with
providers of health insurance that discriminate on the basis of disability.
Despite this seemingly clear prohibition, employers are permitted to contract with
health insurance companies that limit, segregate, and classify persons based upon
their disabilities in adverse ways that deny or significantly limit insurance
coverage.51 Allowing employers to provide discriminatory health insurance benefits
thwarts the clear purpose of the ADA.
2. Title III
Title III provides, in part, “[no] individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who owns, leases . . . or operates a place of public accommodation.”52
48

42 U.S.C §12112.

49

42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(1).

50

Id.

51

See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (containing the “safe harbor” provision).

52

42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2004) in pertinent part reads:
General rule: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.
Construction:
General prohibition.
Activities.
Denial of participation: It shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or class of
individuals on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class,
directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of the
opportunity of the individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity.
Participation in unequal benefit: It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual or
class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or
class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with the
opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege,
advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals.
Separate benefit: It shall be discriminatory to provide an individual or class of
individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class,
directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with a good, service,
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“Public accommodation” is defined only through a list of specific entities that are
considered public accommodations for purposes of Title III, one of which is an
“insurance office.”53 Under Title III, discrimination includes “denial of the
opportunity of the individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity.”54 It
seems clear that disabled persons are protected from discrimination in places of
public accommodation, including insurance offices.
In order to be
nondiscriminatory, insurance offices must not deny an individual or class the
opportunity to participate in or benefit from the good or service provided. As it will
be described, the current state of the law is far from consistent with the plain
language of the statute.
Further, Title III states that the benefits afforded to the disabled must be equal to
the benefits afforded to other individuals unless “action is necessary to provide . . . a
good, service . . . accommodation, or other opportunity that is as effective as that
provided to others.”55 The distinction between “equal” and “equally effective” is
made to indicate that something more than equality is demanded by the law. It is
easier to see this distinction with regard to physical disabilities. For instance, stating
that all persons are welcome to attend a workshop on the second floor would provide
nothing to a person who is wheelchair bound if there is no elevator. Similarly, if a
child with a developmental delay, such as Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) is given
a written science test identical to that given other students, it would be equal, but it
would not be equally effective as that provided to other students.56 Accommodations
are made to ensure that the students are tested on the same playing field, such as
having the test read aloud.57 Tests and procedures cannot be given in an equal
manner; if they are to accommodate, they must be different to ensure that testing will
be equally as effective for the disabled child.58
Disabled persons should receive the same sort of accommodation in health
insurance to ensure equally as effective goods and services are being received.
Current practices in the insurance arena in this country appear to ignore these norms
and mandates. Insurance companies are not providing coverage to mentally disabled
persons that is equal or as equally as effective as coverage provided to the physically
disabled or people with no disability.

facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is different or separate from that
provided to other individuals, unless such action is necessary to provide the individual
or class of individuals with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or
accommodation, or other opportunity that is as effective as that provided to others.
53

42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).

54

42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).

55

Id. at § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).

56

Interview with Megan Ritz, Special Education Teacher, West Geauga Local Schools, in
South Euclid, Ohio (Jan. 13, 2005).
57

Id.

58

Id.
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3. Title V, The Safe Harbor Provision
Title V contains a significant provision, commonly known as the safe harbor
provision.59 On its face, the safe harbor provision provides insurance companies
with the authority to discriminate when administering health care coverage.60
Insurers, medical service companies, and similar organizations are not prohibited or
restricted by Titles I through IV of the ADA with regard to insurance.61 Insurance
companies are free to act without the ADA’s restraints in underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering risks when evaluating potential clients.62
While the “safe harbor” provision seems to give insurers the ability to
discriminate, it contains a limitation that courts have interpreted with difficulty.63
The limitation states that the provision “shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of title [titles] I and III.”64 The Supreme Court has described “subterfuge”
as the intent to serve the purpose of discriminating.65 It appears that insurance
companies can discriminate, but they cannot take advantage of their exemption in a
way that would show a discriminatory intent under the previous provisions of the
ADA.
Legislative history describes the safe harbor provision as providing that a
disabled person cannot be denied insurance or be subjected to different terms of the
plan based on his or her disability alone, so long as the disability does not carry any
increased risks.66 The refusal or limitation must be based on sound actuarial
principles or must be related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience.67 The
59

42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2004) reads:
Insurance. Titles I through IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or
restrict—
an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organization, or
any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from
underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law; or
a person or organization covered by this Act from establishing, sponsoring, observing
or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting
risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not
inconsistent with State law; or
a person or organization covered by this Act from establishing, sponsoring, observing
or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws
that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of title
[titles] I and III [42 USCS §§ 12111 et seq., 12181 et seq.].
60

Id.

61

Id. at § 12201(c)(1).

62

Id. at § 12201(c)(2).

63

Id. at § 12201(c).

64

Id.

65

See Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (describing the term
“subterfuge” with respect to non-fringe-benefit aspect of an employment relationship).
66

H.R. REP. No. 101-485 at 137 (1990) (reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 419).

67

Id.
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legislature gives an example of a blind person, stating that she may not be denied
coverage based on her blindness if there were no independent or actual risk
classifications.68 Title V’s safe harbor provision appears to undermine the very
purpose for which the ADA was enacted. Because risk is inherent to disability, risk
should not be a determinative factor on whether or not a person can be discriminated
against in providing insurance benefits.
B. Interpretations of the ADA
Plaintiffs challenging insurance discrimination in general under the ADA have
not been successful.69 Courts have offered limited protection of dubious worth to
disabled individuals with regard to insurance policy coverage.70 Ten federal circuit
courts have held that employers or insurance companies are not required to provide
plans that cover all disabilities equally.71 Similarly, district courts addressing the
issue have found that unequal insurance benefits do not constitute an ADA
violation.72 The following sub-sections will discuss the various analyses used by
courts in rejecting these general claims.

68

Id.

69

Mathis, supra note 13.

70

See McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179, 187-88 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that
insurance providers must offer the same product to all potential subscribers); Kimber v.
Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that employers must offer
every employee the same plan, regardless of their current or future disability status); Pallozzi
v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that Title III guarantees more
than mere physical access to an insurance agency and therefore insurers cannot refuse to issue
a life insurance policy because of the purchaser’s disability status); Ford v. Schering-Plough,
Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that employers must offer every employee the
same plan, regardless of their current or future disability status); Carparts Distribution Ctr.,
Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Assoc’n, 37 F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that
“public accommodation” within the meaning of Title III of the ADA is not limited to physical
structures and cannot exclude certain disabilities from coverage).
71

See McNeil, 205 F.3d at 188; Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d
1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Aramark Corp., 208 F.3d 266 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting
an ADA claim challenging an employer’s adoption of an insurance cap on coverage of an
AIDS-related treatment on the ground that plaintiff was no longer an employee when the
discrimination in post-employment benefits occurred, but Gonzales was later overruled by
Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2001)); EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank,
207 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2000); Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1101-02; Lewis v. K Mart Corp., 180
F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999);
Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envir. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 436 (4th Cir. 1999); Ford v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997); Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996); EEOC
v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir.1996); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95
F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 1996).
72

First Circuit:

Witham v. Brigham & Women’s Hospital, Inc., Civ. No. 00-268-M, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7027 (D.N.H. May 31, 2001); Wilson v. Globe Specialty Prods., Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d
92 (D. Mass. 2000); Pelletier v. Fleet Fin. Group, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16456 (D.N.H.
Sept. 19, 2000); Connors v. Maine Med. Ctr., 42 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Me. 1999). But see Boots
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1. Disability-Based Distinctions
Courts have determined that not all disability-based distinctions are
discriminatory under the ADA.73 Many insurance plans contain distinctions based
on disabilities, providing varying coverage amounts between both disabled persons
versus non-disabled persons, and between different types of disabilities.74 In
determining what is and is not a disability-based distinction, the courts have
generally narrowed the protections of the ADA.75
Although normally it is impermissible to treat persons with one class of
disabilities differently from persons with another class of disabilities, courts have
permitted distinction between physical and mental illness in the health insurance
context.76 One court justified the disparity by simply stating that insurers have
historically made distinctions in offering health and disability coverage.77 Further
justification is found in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commissions’ (EEOC)
1993 Interim Guidance on Health Insurance.78
Currently, distinctions between mental and physical disabilities are not
considered disability-based distinctions, even though a significantly “lower level of
benefits is provided for the treatment of mental/nervous conditions than is provided
for the treatment of physical conditions.”79 The EEOC reasons that this distinction is
broad and will have an impact on both individuals with and without a disability;
therefore, it does not intentionally discriminate on the basis of disability.80 What the

v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D.N.H. 1999) (denying motion to
dismiss because capping disability benefits for mental illnesses at 24 months while providing
such benefits for physical illnesses until the age of 65 could give rise to a claim of
discrimination under Title III).
Fifth Circuit:
Fermin v. Conseco Direct Life Ins. Co., SA-98-CA-0943, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6204,
*36-40 (W.D. Tex. May 1, 2001) (extending the holding in McNeil v. Time Insurance Co.,
205 F.3d 179, 199 (5th Cir. 2000), which held that a health insurance plan that limited
coverage for AIDS to $10,000 did not violate the ADA, to a long-term disability plan that had
different coverage for mental and for physical disabilities); Templet v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield
of La., CA-99-1400, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15605 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2000).
Eleventh Circuit:
World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
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Mathis, supra note 13.
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Id.
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See Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1116 (citing Rogers, 174 F.3d at 435).
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See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Interim Guidance on Application of
ADA to Health Insurance, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 109 (June 8, 1993), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/health.html [hereinafter EEOC Guidance].
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See Krauel, 95 F.3d at 678 (quoting EEOC’s Interim Guidance).
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See EEOC Guidance, supra note 78.
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EEOC and the courts following EEOC guidance do not note is, though there are nondisabled individuals who may be adversely affected by this distinction, disabled
persons will absolutely be affected.
Disability-based distinctions in insurance coverage allow insurance companies to
discriminate against individuals with certain disabilities by providing them with little
or no insurance coverage.81 These distinctions have a discriminatory effect upon the
disabled, as they are the vast majority of those receiving the inferior coverage.82
Courts must not rely on the EEOC’s guidance or similar tools, as they do not
properly evaluate the effect that disability-based distinctions have on the disabled.
2. Public Accommodations
Separate and unequal benefits in places of public accommodation are disallowed
under Title III.83 Access to insurance benefits should be considered a public
accommodation, and therefore, neither separate, nor unequal benefits should be
allowed under the ADA.
Plaintiffs asserting that unequal insurance benefits violate Title III of the ADA
have seen varying results.84 Three circuits have found that Title III does not apply to
insurance products, because while the physical premises of an insurance office are
subject to Title III, the products offered by the insurer are not.85
The First and Second circuits have found that Title III of the ADA does apply to
the coverage provided by insurance policies.86 These courts provided some
protection to the disabled, but the extent of that protection is still very unclear.87
While the First Circuit held that Title III does apply to the sale of insurance,
regardless of whether the individual actually enters the structure of an insurance
office, it did not decide whether Title III applies to the terms and conditions
contained in that policy.88 The Second Circuit somewhat addressed what the First
Circuit left open, but with a limiting effect.89 The second circuit held that “an entity
covered by Title III is not only obligated . . . to provide disabled persons with
physical access, but is also prohibited from refusing to sell them its merchandise by
reason of discrimination against their disability.”90 This ruling states only that the
insurance company may not refuse to sell, it does not state that they must sell
81

Susan Nanovic Flannery, Employer Health-Care Plans: The Feasibility of DisabilityBased Distinctions Under ERISA and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 12 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 211, 215 (1995).
82

Id.

83

42 U.S.C. § 12182.
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Mathis, supra note 13.

85

See Ford, 145 F.3d at 614; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014; Lenox, 149 F.3d at 453; Weyer,
198 F.3d at 115.
86

Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 33; Carparts Disrib. Ctr., 37 F.3d at 19.
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Mathis, supra note 13.

88

Id. (citing Carparts Disrib. Ctr., 37 F.3d at 20).
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Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 32-33.
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Id.
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packages to disabled individuals that are as effective as those provided to nondisabled individuals.91 Overall, the courts have generally concluded that as long as
the same benefit package is provided to everyone, even though that package may
provide very different coverage for mental versus physical disabilities, the ADA has
not been violated.92 Thus, though a claim based on total exclusion from benefits
might succeed, a claim based on inferior mental health benefits is much less likely to
succeed.93
Though circuits are split as to whether disabled individuals have a claim under
Title III, there is no controversy with regard to insurance benefits that are equal in
terms but not in effect.94 Title III requires that equal and/or equally effective
accommodations be provided to those who are disabled.95 Since insurance coverage
is considered a public accommodation, courts should follow a Title III analysis and
require insurance coverage that is either equal in terms or effect, whichever provides
the individual with full and equal enjoyment of the service. By only offering a claim
under Title III when there has been a total exclusion from benefits, and not
considering the equality of terms and effect of the benefit provided, the courts have
significantly limited the ADA’s protection.96
3. The Safe Harbor Provision
Historically interpretations of the safe harbor provision have severely limited
plaintiff’s ability to use the ADA to force employers and insurers to offer equal and
adequate benefits to persons with disabilities.97 The safe harbor provision in Title V
provides an exemption from the ADA in “establishing, sponsoring, observing or
administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting
risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks . . . .”98 Essentially, as long as a
disabled person is disabled enough to produce a real financial risk, they can be
discriminated against because the safe harbor provision provides this outlet. To
qualify for the safe harbor, the plan must be consistent with existing state law,99 and
cannot be used as “subterfuge” to evade the purpose of previous titles of the ADA.100
91

Id.

92

Ford, 145 F.3d at 608; Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 33.

93

Mathis, supra note 13.
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Equal in terms means that, on the face of the insurance package, all terms are equal.
Equal in effect means that the effect of the terms is equal. (For example, an employer
offers an insurance plan that contains a $10,000 cap on the treatment of physical
conditions. This exact plan is offered to all employees; therefore, it is equal in its
terms. However, one employee has cancer and the treatment of her physical
conditions is sure to exceed $10,000. The effect of this benefit is now unequal
because one employee will not receive the benefit as all other employees will.)
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42 U.S.C. § 12182.
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Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 32-33.
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Mathis, supra note 13.
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42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
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Id.
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The EEOC states that “subterfuge refers to disability-based disparate treatment
that is not justified by the risks or costs associated with the disability.”101 Plaintiffs
have used this definition to argue that the safe harbor provision is inapplicable where
differences in benefits are not justified by actuarial data. Courts have rejected this
argument finding that there is no requirement that insurers provide actuarial
justifications for differences in benefits.102
Some courts have read the safe harbor provision more broadly than the EEOC
has by defining subterfuge as a “scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion.”103
Consequently, these courts have found subterfuge only when the employer or insurer
has engaged in intentional conduct in order to carry out some non-insurance related
discrimination.104 Courts placing an intentional requirement within the definition of
“subterfuge” have narrowed the provision beyond what was originally intended.105
4. The Narrowing Effect
In general, our society has come to know two major themes about health
insurance. First, health insurance is important, and second, having it is good.106 For
a person who is disabled, “important” is a term that severely understates the value of
this essential, and just “having it” is not good enough.107 Disabled persons face

101

See EEOC Guidance, supra note 78, at III(c)(2).

102

Ford, 145 F.3d at 611; see also Leonard F., 199 F.3d at 101-05 (refusing to extend
subterfuge clause to policies created before the adoption of the ADA); Modderno, 82 F.3d at
1064 (refusing to extend subterfuge clause to policies created before the adoption of the
ADA); Aramark Corp., 208 F.3d at 271-272 (refusing to extend subterfuge clause to policies
created before the adoption of the ADA); Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679 (rejecting the EEOC
guidance on subterfuge because it is “at odds” with the ADA); Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115
(ruling for defendant on basis of safe harbor provision without applying subterfuge clause).
But see Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 36 (“[T]he subterfuge clause suggests that, notwithstanding
compliance with state law, Titles I and III do apply to insurance practices where conformity
with state law is used as a subterfuge to evade their purposes.”); Zamora-Quezada v. Health
Texas Med. Group of San Antonio, 34 F. Supp. 2d 433, 444 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (presuming
safe harbor provision is applicable where defendants engaged in financial practices that
created cost-cutting incentives to delay or deny services in order to force higher-cost
individuals with disabilities to go elsewhere, to prevail defendants would have to establish a
bona fide benefit plan engaged in lawful risk assessment; motion for dismissal or summary
judgment denied because record does).
103
See Ford, 145 F.3d at 611 (reading based on the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act’s definition of the term, as construed by the Supreme Court in Pub. Employees Ret. Sys.
of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)).
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See Mathis, supra note 13.
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See generally, Symposium, Paths to Universal Health Insurance: Progressive Lessons
from the Past for the Future, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 205 (2004).
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Mitchell LaPlante, Health Insurance Coverage of People with Disabilities in the U.S.,
U.S. Department of Education, National Institute of Disability and Rehabilitation Research,
Number 7 (May 1994).
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serious challenges because of their distinct and substantial need for health care.108
People with mental and/or physical disabilities are more likely to have low incomes,
be older, be women, and are much less likely to be employed.109 They have
particular needs and should have access to the health care system with adequate
health insurance, while encountering the fewest barriers.110 Other than claiming
outside of the ADA,111 successful challenges are usually based on total exclusions
from insurance rather than the inability to attain adequate and proper health
insurance due to insurance company discrimination.112 Courts have not found any
provision of the ADA to be applicable to the terms of health insurance plans.
Consequently, disabled individuals are severely limited in their ability to succeed on
claims under the ADA with respect to discriminatory practices by insurance
companies. The following sections will discuss health insurance discrimination
against the mentally disabled and the effect of that discrimination, as the mentally
disabled are among the most widely effected by narrow interpretations of the ADA.
IV. THE ADA’S NEW OUTCAST: THE MENTALLY DISABLED
Over the past thirty years, the United States has made significant progress in the
field of disability rights, most notably through the ADA.113 Though progress has
been made, there is still widespread discrimination against persons with mental
disabilities in the United States.114 Though experts in the field have pushed hard for
disability rights to be viewed as civil rights, the state of our law is far from this
ideal.115 As discussed above, our court system barely considers disability rights to be
civil rights, and without this recognition disabled individuals are disadvantaged. The
ADA has been much more effective for the physically disabled than the mentally
disabled.116

108
Kristina Hanson, Uncovering the Health Challenges Facing People with Disabilities:
The Role of Health Insurance, The People-to-People Health Foundation (November 2003)
(citing J.A. Meyer and P.J. Zeller, Profiles of Disability: Employment and Health Coverage,
Washington: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (September 1999)).
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Id. (recalling the findings of the survey on which her article is based).

110

Id.

111
There may be available action under state anti-discrimination laws, contract theories,
state insurance claims, and state mental health parity laws.
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See Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Delaware, 924 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Tex.
1996) (holding that safe harbor provision is not applicable in cases of total denial of insurance;
a complete denial is a per se violation of the ADA’s mandate that employers provide
individuals with disabilities equal access to insurance coverage).
113

Michael Posner, The Human Rights of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: Different
but Equal, 63 MD. L. REV. 203 (2004).
114

Id.

115

Id.
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See Jacobi, supra note 4, at 186.
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A. Allowable Insurance Discrimination Against the Mentally Disabled
Under the ADA, a person is disabled if he or she has an impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities, if he or she has a record of such
an impairment or is regarded as having such an impairment.117 The statute also
describes who exactly is covered, and from a plain textual reading of the statute, all
provisions apply to the mentally disabled as well as the physically disabled.118
The text of the ADA appears to disallow disparity in health insurance benefits
between the mentally and physically disabled.119 For one, employers may not
exclude or deny equal jobs or benefits to a disabled person under the ADA.120 It also
bars discrimination that denies the full and equal enjoyment of the goods and
services of places of public accommodation to persons with disabilities (which
includes an insurance office).121 Mental disabilities such as schizophrenia, attention
deficit disorder, and autism clearly limit life activities, and these persons are
regarded as having a disability. Though the mentally disabled can be just as disabled
as the physically disabled, recent interpretations ensure that only the physically
disabled or, in some cases, the severely mentally impaired, will be covered.122
Common perceptions and prejudices often exclude the “less” mentally disabled from
this “lucky” group of severely mentally impaired individuals.123
Current health insurance policies overtly discriminate against the mentally
disabled. Often, health insurance policies do not cover mental health care at all, and
if they do, there is great disproportion in the quality and duration of mental versus
physical care. One popular method of discrimination against the mentally disabled is
time limits on treatment of mental disabilities (durational caps).124 They are usually
for one or two years, at which point coverage for mental health services is simply cut
off. Sometimes this is hinged on whether or not the covered person is currently
hospitalized for the condition.
One insurer had a uniform policy of denying disability insurance to anyone who
had received any mental health services, such as seeing a therapist within two years
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42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

118

Id.
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See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (on employment); 42 U.S.C. § 12182; 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)
(containing the “safe harbor” provision).
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See 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
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See 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
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See Jacobi, supra note 4, at 185.
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See Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (reversing a decision
that found an employee suffering from “carpal tunnel syndrome, myotendinitis, and thoracic
outlet compression” disabled in part because the lower court disregarded evidence that the
employee was capable of engaging in household chores such as bathing and brushing her
teeth); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (rejecting a claim that an
employee denied an opportunity on the basis of a physical impairment was “regarded as”
disabled unless the employer subjectively assessed the impairment as substantially limiting
major life activities).
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Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
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of applying for the insurance.125 Another precludes coverage for anyone with an
occurrence of bipolar disorder more than twice in a lifetime or once within five years
of applying for the policy.126 Another astonishing example includes a policy that
denied coverage to “applicants who report having received treatment for a mental or
nervous condition, regardless of seriousness, within twelve months prior to
application.”127 Whether the courts or insurance companies want to recognize it,
overt discrimination in the insurance arena is very present and persistent.
Various circuits have addressed the issue of disparity between mental and
physical disabilities in health insurance. Notable circuit decisions include the Third
Circuit’s 1998 decision finding that the ADA does not contain a parity requirement
for mental and physical disability benefits.128 The court held, “[s]o long as every
employee is offered the same plan regardless of that employee’s contemporary or
future disability status, then no discrimination has occurred even if the plan offers
different coverage for various disabilities.”129 The court also opined that the ADA
does not require equal coverage for every type of disability, and if this requirement
did exist, it would destabilize the insurance industry.130 In the case of a state’s longterm disability plan that included a one year cap for mental health care, the Fourth
Circuit held that the ADA does not require equal benefits for mental and physical
disabilities, nor does it mandate that the plan sponsors justify risk classification with
actuarial data.131
These and similar holdings have been justified with the legislative history of the
ADA.132 These committee reports have expressed the view that “employee benefits
plans should not be found to be in violation of [the] legislation . . . simply because
they do not address the special needs of every person with a disability.”133 Courts
also looked to the EEOC’s interim guidance on the ADA’s application to health
insurance.134 EEOC’s guidance offers little support for equality. It states, health
insurance plans distinguishing between the benefits provided for the treatment of
physical and mental conditions do not violate the ADA.135
The Sixth Circuit ruled on the issue in the widely cited case, Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.136 In Parker, the plaintiff/employee suffered
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Goldman v. Standard Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2003).

126

Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 950 F. Supp 422 (D.N.H. 1996).
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Id. at 608.
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Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 432, 437 (4th Cir. 1999).
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Id. at 434 (citing S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 85 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 137
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 420).
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from severe depression. The employee challenged her employer’s long-term
disability plan, which capped mental disability benefits at one year unless the insured
was hospitalized.137 The very same plan provided benefits for physical disability
care until age sixty-five.138 The court held that the ADA only prohibits
discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled, not between various
disabilities.139
In a Seventh Circuit decision, an employee suffering from severe depression and
bipolar disorder challenged her employer-provided plan that also capped mental
disability benefits at two years while providing physical health benefits to the age of
sixty-five.140 The court stated that, though the great disparity in long-term benefits
between the physically versus the mentally disabled “may or may not be an
enlightened way to do things,” the disparity was not discriminatory.141 The court
admitted the narrow scope of the ADA with regard to the inferior coverage offered to
persons with mental disablies, but ultimately found that the distinction between
physical and mental health care coverage was not in violation of the ADA.142
Remarkably, the court further stated, “although such distinction may have a greater
impact on certain individuals with disabilities, they do not intentionally discriminate
on the basis of disability and do not violate the ADA.”143 We must ask ourselves,
how much more intentional can written provisions in insurance policies that limit
and exclude particular disabled persons from an opportunity to attain health
insurance be?
The Ninth Circuit offered an offensively simple approach to the complex and
important issue of mental illness discrimination in heath insurance. In similar facts
as the Sixth and Seventh Circuit decisions, the court found that “there is no
discrimination under the [ADA] where disabled individuals are given the same
opportunity as everyone else.”144 As long as insurance distinctions are applied to all
employees, then they cannot be discriminating.145 Furthermore, in seeming support
of insurance company concerns, the Ninth Circuit went on to support its holding by
stating, [“]insurers have historically and consistently made distinctions between
mental and physical illness in offering health and disability coverage.”146 Is the court
really using a historical basis to justify their determination? How simple the law
would be, if history and consistency were truly our only precedent, for the people of
this country would have not a single civil right.
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Id. at 1015-16.
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The Tenth Circuit, in similar facts and with the support of these various circuits
also found in favor in the defendant/employer.147 The court reasoned that even
though the plan does make a distinction between different types of disabilities, this is
far different than an employee facing differential treatment due to her disability.148
The Tenth Circuit clearly has missed the point that not only is this type of
discrimination the very essence of differential treatment, but is one of the worst kind.
The Tenth Circuit appears to be comparing a demotion or name-calling to the denial
of health insurance benefits.
When addressing similar issues, some circuits have been confronted with §504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. A plaintiff in the District of Columbia Circuit claimed that
her employer provided health insurance plan violated section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act in that the plan placed a cap of $75,000.00 for mental health care,
and no similar limit existed for physical health benefits. 149 Section 504 states, “No
otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from . . . participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any . . . program or activity
conducted by an executive agency . . . .”150 Despite the plain language of Section
504, the court found that disparities in health insurance coverage between the
mentally and physically disabled were no different than generalized limits, which are
permissible. 151
These decisions have destroyed what little protection is provided to persons with
mental health disabilities. The lack of coverage by insurance companies and
disregard of the problem by courts may largely be due to the very prejudices and
discriminatory practices creators of the ADA wished to avoid. Mental illness is
often viewed not as a disease, but rather a personal weakness or lack of character.152
Widespread lack of knowledge about mental diseases and disabilities feeds much of
the avoidance, disregard and prejudice against the mentally disabled.153 This
widespread lack of knowledge clearly exists within the insurance industry and the
court system.
B. Effects on Health
Not only have the recent decisions resulted in further discrimination against the
disabled, they have an adverse effect on mental health. The National Institute of
Mental Health agrees that the majority of people with a mental disorder can be
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diagnosed and effectively treated through psychotherapy and medication.154 Many
people fail to recognize that mental illness is a disease of the brain.155 “Brain
research demonstrates that disorders as different as stroke, anxiety disorders, alcohol
addiction, anorexia, learning disabilities, and Alzheimer’s disease all have their roots
in the brain.”156 The Institute further states, “Every American will be affected at
some point in his or her life, either personally or by a family member’s struggle, with
a brain disorder.”157 Though mental illness it is often trivialized and is left untreated
because of this misconception, effective treatments are available for almost all
mental disorders, especially those most common, such as anxiety disorder.158
Untreated, a mental brain disorder usually becomes more and more disabling, and
eventually can lead to severe depression, alcoholism, drug use, or commonly
suicide.159
Research has shown that more than 90 percent of people who commit suicide
have depression or another diagnosable mental or substance abuse disorder, often in
combination with other mental disorders.160 The majority of people “who have
received treatment for mental illnesses show genuine improvement over time and
lead stable, productive lives.”161
Untreated or mistreated mental illness can have devastating results. Treatment for
mental disabilities has proven effective, and scientific knowledge in the area is
extensive. But, since Americans rely primarily on health insurance to pay medical
bills, and insurance coverage excludes or greatly limits mental health coverage, these
effective and approved treatments are not utilized as they should be.
C. Effects on Employment
One of the main goals in passing the ADA in 1990 was to increase employment
opportunities for people with disabilities who wanted to, and could, work, but were
being kept out of the job market because of discrimination on the basis of
disability.162 It has become clear that the goal for protection from employment
discrimination based on mental disabilities has not been met. This attempted
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protection has even been called a “delusion of rights,” rights that never really
existed.163
When the ADA was being considered, research submitted to Congress cited
discrimination as a significant cause of the striking level of unemployment among
people with disabilities.164 Research has also shown that people with psychiatric
disabilities are subject to more severe employment discrimination than people with
other types of disabilities.165 Yet, analysis of reported cases and research supports
the conclusion that people with mental disabilities have received little benefit from
the ADA’s protections against employment discrimination.166 In a 1999 survey
encompassing cases regarding potential discrimination by employers under the
ADA, employers prevailed 95.7% of the time in federal appellate court.167
Discrimination against the mentally disabled hinders the opportunity to be employed,
which has a negative effect on the job market.
In order for a disabled person to be protected under the ADA, he or she must be
capable of performing the essential functions of the job.168 Therefore, even if the
ADA covers the employee’s illness, if he is incapable of performing the essential
functions of the job, he is unable to take advantage of the ADA’s protections.169
Currently, many mentally disabled persons in and out of the workplace are not
receiving adequate and appropriate medical care due to the lack of coverage in their
health insurance plans. When an employee is not treated for a mental illness she is
less likely to be able to perform the essential functions of her job. Essentially, this
allowable discrimination in health insurance coverage is creating a class of mentally
disabled persons who are not protected under the ADA in an employment setting.
They are unable to hold jobs, which is directly contravening the purpose for which
the legislation was enacted. This type of discrimination is the quintessential “vicious
circle”. The fact is, if these persons had the opportunity to receive proper medical
care, many of them would be able to function in their job, in society, and in life.
V. A COMPARISON: THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND THE ADA
Adequate health insurance and adequate housing are both essential components
of a safe and healthy life. As indicated, a mentally disabled person is likely to
encounter many barriers when attempting to attain adequate health insurance due to
his or her disability. On the other hand, a mentally disabled person is unlikely to
encounter barriers due to discrimination when attaining adequate housing.
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Housing is one of our basic needs. Currently in the United States, there are
approximately 274 million people living in approximately 105 million owned or
rented units.170 This is approximately 97.5% of the population, according to the
2000 Census.171 Because shelter is a recognized basic need, the Fair Housing Act
Amendments of 1988 requires equality for the disabled living in, buying, or renting a
dwelling.
In 2003, approximately 243 million people had health insurance,172 which is
approximately 86.5% of the population.173 There is a strong argument that health
insurance is a basic need as well. At the very least, it is a need, utilized by the vast
majority of our population, which deserves adequate and supportive measures
against discrimination. The court, legislature, and persons able to acquire adequate
insurance have an easier time dismissing health insurance as a benefit rather than a
necessity. It is those who do not have adequate health insurance, like the mentally
disabled, who realized how very necessary the “benefit” really is.
The Fair Housing Act has done a stellar job making it clear that fair housing is a
basic need deserving of protection. The policy choice was likely made easier
because, generally, people understand the importance of shelter. Since the ADA and
the Fair Housing Act Amendments are comparable in purpose and in statutory form,
a comparable application should follow. The following sections will look at the Fair
Housing Act Amendments, and discuss the disparity seen between decisions
interpreting it and those interpreting the ADA.
A. Background of the Fair Housing Act Amendments
The Fair Housing Act was enacted in 1968, during a time in which our country
was headed toward a sharp divide between races.174 The Fair Housing Act banned
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, and national origin in the hopes of
creating a truly integrated society.175 “Handicap” was added in 1988 via the Fair
Housing Amendments Act (FHAA). The Amendments were seen as “a clear
pronouncement of a national commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of
persons with handicaps from the American mainstream.”176
The definition of “handicap” under the Fair Housing Act Amendments and the
definition of “disability” under the ADA are identical. Both definitions arise out of
the definition provided in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which was intended to
cover the widest possible range of disabilities that limit activities such as walking,
170
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seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.177 It was also intended
to include a wide variety of impairments, including a range of physiological
disorders and conditions such as mental retardation, emotional and mental illness.178
Under the Fair Housing Act Amendments and the ADA, a “handicap” or
“disability” is a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of such person’s major life activities, there is a record of such impairment, or the
person is regarded as having such impairment.179 The courts that have interpreted
these definitions have done so broadly and have included physical and mental
impairments such as those who are substantially limited by alcoholism, emotional
problems, mental illness, learning disabilities, and many difficulties associated with
old age.180 Yet there appears to be a trend toward defining “disability” more
narrowly under the ADA than it is under the Fair Housing Act Amendments.
Though the language in the statutes is identical, the application of, and therefore
the protections offered have been strikingly different. Allowable practices under the
ADA support overt discrimination against the mentally disabled. On the contrary,
court interpretations of the FHAA have not permitted such discrimination. The
FHAA has been interpreted to disallow discrimination against mentally disabled to
the exact same degree as physically disabled persons.
B. Applications of the FHAA
Both the ADA and the Fair Housing Act Amendments addressing disability are
based on the same fundamental principle, which is, ending discrimination against
persons on the basis of disability. Though the language and proposed intent of the
ADA and the FHAA are identical, the laws as applied to both physically and
mentally disabled persons, are very different.
Under the FHAA there truly is no distinction between mental and physical illness
with regard to attaining adequate, appropriate, and fair housing. Housing providers
may not refuse to deal with people because they are disabled, whether physically or
mentally.181 As we have seen, this is a practice that is not prohibited under the ADA
with regard to health insurance.
1. Nondiscrimination Under the FHAA
Housing providers may not ask whether the applicant has a disability or is
associated with anyone who has a disability, nor may they inquire into the nature or
severity of a disability.182 This restriction does not prohibit inquiry into an
applicant’s ability to meet the requirements of ownership or tenancy, provided the
inquiry is made of all applicants, whether or not they have handicaps. Current case
law exemplifies the narrow exceptions to the confines created by the FHAA.
177
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One example is that housing providers, unlike health insurance providers, may
not inquire into the nature of disability. In Cason v. Rochester Housing Authority, a
city housing authority was held to have violated the Fair Housing Act
Amendments183 by denying housing to certain individuals who had physical or
mental disabilities.184 These persons were denied on the grounds that they failed to
satisfy a criterion of being able to live independently.185 The housing authority
determined potential tenants’ ability to live independently by requiring them to
answer detailed inquiries regarding the nature and scope of their disabilities and to
authorize the release of medical information.186 The court held that a portion of the
authority’s manual entitled “Standards for Tenant Selection Criteria” requiring an
applicant to demonstrate an ability “to live independently” violates federal statutes
and is contrary to federal regulations concerning discrimination in housing and must
not be utilized in the tenant selection process.187
Following strict application, the FHAA is violated upon a showing of
discriminatory intent. In Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan and
Zoning Commission of the Town of Fairfield, the court stated that a plaintiff could
establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act Amendments188 by showing
discriminatory intent or discriminatory impact.189 The court explained that, under
discriminatory intent analysis, the plaintiff must demonstrate only that his or her
handicapped status was one factor, not the sole factor, in the defendant’s decision.190
Also, the court added that an undesirable discriminatory intent could be
demonstrated through an inquiry into certain factors; specifically, (1) discriminatory
impact, (2) the historical background of the decision, (3) the sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision, (4) departures from normal procedural
sequences, and (5) departures from normal substantive criteria.191 The court further
explained that, to prevail on a claim of discriminatory treatment, the plaintiff is not
required to show that the defendant was motivated solely, or even predominantly, by
the plaintiff’s handicapped status. It is sufficient only to show that such status was a
motivating factor in the defendant’s action.192 If this analysis were to be used under
the ADA with regard to its application to health insurance providers, plans that
distinguished mental and physical illness would be deemed discriminatory.
Further, the court has expressly stated that exceptions to the FHAA are to be
narrowly construed. In Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., a former resident of a group
183
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home for the mentally handicapped, challenged certain restrictions that the defendant
city had imposed as a condition of the issuance of a special permit to live in a
residential district.193 The court stated that the exceptions to the Fair Housing Act
Amendment’s prohibitions on discrimination should be narrowly construed.194 The
court held that restrictions on housing for persons with disabilities, which are
predicated on public safety, cannot be based on blanket stereotypes about the
handicapped, and the restrictions must be tailored to particularized concerns about
individual person with disabilities.195 Further, the court noted, any special
requirements placed on housing for the handicapped, based on concerns for the
protection of the disabled, must be unique to the needs associated with particular
kinds of disabilities.196 The Fair Housing Act Amendments are unwilling to
compromise a disabled person’s right to fair housing. The ADA should follow a
similar unwillingness to compromise a disabled person’s right to adequate health
insurance.
Under the ADA, willingness to compromise overwhelms the meager protections
offered to the mentally disabled. Through insurance practices, the ADA has
compromised the rights of the very person it professes to protect. If housing
providers may not refuse tenants based on their disability, why do we allow an
insurance company to do just that? It is unthinkable that a landlord would be
permitted to tell a tenant that, since he or she has bipolar disease, he or she is too
risky and therefore not a desirable candidate to live in this dwelling. Yet, insurance
companies are statutorily permitted to use financial risks to deny or limit the
coverage they provide to the mentally disabled.
A housing provider may only refuse to rent to a person who possess a significant
risk of causing physical harm to others, or substantial physical damage to the
property of others.197 There are no health concerns or safety risks to physical
property in providing equal health coverage to the mentally and physically disabled.
Exceptions provided by the FHAA are based on a significant risk to health, safety, or
property. Though the FHAA is partially motivated by financial risk, house reports
indicate that this provision was not intended to permit housing to be denied based on
presumptions. It is impermissible for a landlord or landowner to deny housing on a
presumption that handicapped people generally pose a greater threat to the health,
safety and/or property of others than non-handicapped buyers or renters.198
Alternatively, the ADA’s exceptions are based on presumptions that disabled people
pose a greater financial risk.
2. Real Accommodations
The Fair Housing Act Amendments declare it unlawful to refuse to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when the
193
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accommodation is necessary to afford a handicapped person equal opportunity to use
and enjoy a dwelling.199 A plaintiff bringing a claim against a housing provider for
refusing to make a reasonable accommodation, in addition to showing the
accommodation is reasonable must also show that: (1) the plaintiff suffers from a
handicap, (2) the defendant knew or should reasonably be expected to have known of
this handicap, (3) accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford the
plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the housing involved, and (4) the
defendant refused to make such an accommodation.200 When shown, the FHAA may
require landlords to assume reasonable financial burdens in accommodating
handicapped residents.201 Also, the public use and common use portion of all multifamily dwellings must be readily accessible and usable by handicapped persons.202
Further, the FHAA specifically makes it unlawful to refuse to permit, at the
expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications to existing premises
occupied or to be occupied by such a person if such modifications are necessary to
afford such person full enjoyment of the premises.203 With respect to rental housing,
the FHAA provides that a landlord may, where reasonable, condition permission for
a modification on the lessee’s or tenant’s restoration of the interior of the premises to
the condition that existed before the modification, reasonable wear and tear
excepted.204 The purpose of such allowance and requirements is to ensure every
disabled person an equal opportunity to enjoy a dwelling.205 These FHAA
allowances and requirements of reasonable accommodations make no distinction
between the mentally and physically disabled, and essentially allow a disabled
person to buy a “better” plan if need be.
No such accommodations or allowance of accommodation at the disabled
person’s expense exist under the ADA. The vast disparity between the application of
the FHAA and the ADA’s application to health insurance coverage has been
exemplified in current case law.
In Samuelson v. Mid-Atlantic Realty Co., plaintiff was forced to break his lease
early due to a serious deterioration in his mental condition, which made it unsafe for
him to continue living in the apartment for the remainder of his lease.206 The court
found that the plaintiff had stated a cognizable claim of handicap discrimination
under the FHAA by alleging that the defendant failed to reasonably accommodate
him by waiving an assessment of rent for the remainder of his lease.207 In the
interest of protecting the rights of the disabled, the court will decide against a
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landlord even if it poses some financial inconvenience. With regard to the ADA, the
court offers no such disposition.
Under the FHAA, meaningful access is important to the court. In Oconomowoc
Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Greenfield, the court concluded that a state
zoning requirement (that 2,500 feet should exist between community-based
residential facilities) was discriminatory against (mentally disabled) adults.208 The
court concluded that by substantially limiting meaningful access to housing for the
developmentally disabled, the spacing requirement was discriminatory. The court
held that special zoning permission was a reasonable accommodation under the
FHAA. Reasonable accommodations have been repeatedly provided for the
mentally disabled,209 just as the physically disabled have been accommodated under
the FHAA.
The FHAA has been construed very broadly with regard to accommodating both
the physically and mentally disabled equally. All allowances, such as allowing
reasonable modifications to be made, or requirements, such as reasonable
accommodation in rental policies are applied to both mentally and physically
disabled persons.
Recall, under Title I of the ADA, employers are obligated to provide reasonable
accommodations for disabled individuals in the workplace.210 This obligation should
apply equally to both the mentally and physically disabled, as it applies under the
FHAA. The FHAA and the ADA’s use of “reasonable accommodations” is derived
from interpretations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.211 Both the FHAA and the
ADA came after the Rehabilitation Act, and were at least in part, derived from it.
Yet, the ADA does not require reasonable accommodations to be applied equally to
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both mentally and physically disabled persons in health insurance. Because health
insurance companies create coverage that is not applied equally, their policies are
discriminatory.
3. A Simple Test
The FHAA not only protects persons searching for housing, but it also ensures
their right to equal treatment once they become residents.212 It is unlawful to
“discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with
such dwelling, because of a handicap.”213 According to the HUD regulation, it is
unlawful to “deny or limit” housing-related services based on any FHAA-prohibited
factor.214 The practices covered by this prohibition include “limiting the use of
privileges, services or facilities associated with a dwelling . . . .”215 Even evictions
based on nondiscriminatory and generally acceptable reasons, such as failure to pay
rent on time, unruly behavior, and poor housekeeping, may violate the FHAA so
long as the conduct is attributable to the resident’s disability and could be remedied
by a reasonable accommodation.216 Further, “reasonable accommodations” ensure
housing equally as effective for all disabled persons.
Recall that, currently, insurance companies are permitted to underwrite risks,
classify risks, and administer such risks into the terms of a benefit plan.217 The
legislative history of the ADA notes that insurers may limit coverage based on
“classification of risks” and may refuse to insure, limit insurance, or charge a
different rate based on an individual’s disability when such practice is based on
sound actuarial principles or is related to actual or reasonably anticipated
experience.218 This simple test consists of examining the effect on insurers’ practices
if they were to practice as housing providers under the FHAA, and then examine the
effect on housing providers’ practices if they were to practice as insurers under the
ADA, as interpreted.
Under FHAA restraints, a health insurance company would not be permitted to
discriminate against persons seeking a benefit plan. This means insurance providers
would not be permitted to ask an applicant if she has a disability, or if she is
associated with anyone who has a disability. Nor may the insurance provider
inquire into the nature or severity of a disability.219 This restriction would not
prohibit inquiry into an applicant’s ability to meet the requirements of the plan
(namely payment) provided the inquiry is made of all applicants, whether or not they
212
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have disabilities. Further, the insurance provider would be unable to limit the use of
privileges and services of the policy in a discriminatory manner.220 This would mean
that durational caps, such as a two-year cap on mental health coverage as opposed to
coverage for physical disabilities until the age of sixty-five, would be prohibited.
Distinguishing between mental disabilities and physical disabilities in health
insurance plans would be deemed discriminatory, in violation of the statute, and
disallowed.
Let us hypothesize that the ADA mandates are utilized in fair housing. Under the
ADA structure, a housing provider has the authority to ask if an applicant has a
disability, and inquire into the nature and severity of the disability.221 Upon inquiry,
if the housing provider deems this disability, and the behavior stemming from it, as a
risk to him financially, he may refuse this person housing, limit his offer, or charge
this person a higher rate so long as it is based on sound actuary principles. The law
permits him to openly discriminate by denying housing to this person based on a
particular disability.
This is the norm for insurance companies today. The comparison is shocking.
Current discriminatory practices by health insurance companies are inexcusable.
Their practices need to be curbed, in the same fashion and under the same constraints
posed and practiced by housing providers under the FHAA.
C. The FHAA and Home Insurance Discrimination
Home insurance discrimination claims have been brought both under the ADA
and the FHAA. Claims brought under the FHAA, have seen much more success,
than those brought under the ADA. For instance, claims requesting reasonable
accommodations by housing insurance companies have been much better received
under the FHAA.
Insurance companies have attempted to side step the law in home insurance
practices. Companies have refused to write insurance, or have charged higher rates
to disabled persons or to housing providers with disabled tenants.222 In Wai v.
Allstate Insurance Co., relying on the ADA, a district court held that the FHAA bars
insurance companies from refusing to provide standard insurance at ordinary rates to
landlords with disabled tenants.223 The court held that this type of insurance
discrimination violated the FHAA’s “otherwise make unavailable” and
“discriminatory terms-and-conditions” provisions as well as its “reasonable
accommodations” mandate.224 This case exemplifies the intolerance for
discriminatory activity of FHAA enforcers.
In Avalon Residential Care Homes, Inc. v. GE Financial Assurance Co., the court
did not find a violation in the insurance company’s activity.225 An insurance
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company was sued for not changing its long-term nursing home care indemnity
policy to cover a disabled resident.226 The court held that the reasonable
accommodation provision was not violated because the defendant offered equal
coverage to disabled and non-disabled persons (i.e., neither group was covered). The
Avalon opinion relied on a decision that had interpreted an ADA provision
forbidding businesses from denying people with disabilities the full and equal
enjoyment of goods and services. Relying on ADA interpretation, the court found
the discriminatory insurance practice lawful.
Courts that rely on the ADA for interpretation of the FHAA have encountered
criticism.227 It has been professed that not all courts agree that the ADA provision
cited in Avalon is as limited as the Fifth Circuit held.228 Also, Avalon’s reliance on
this ADA provision to interpret the FHAA’s reasonable accommodations provision
seems questionable.229 As seen in Avalon, when relying on the ADA for
interpretation, it is more likely that a discriminatory insurance practice will be
deemed lawful. The FHAA, by its terms, goes beyond the simple denial of access; it
requires changes in a defendant’s “rules, policies, practices, or services” that may be
necessary to afford a disabled person equal housing opportunities.230 The disabled
persons’ right to home insurance was jeopardized in this case because of reliance on
discriminatory ADA interpretation, but there is hope that FHAA interpretations will
prevail in the future.231
Scholars have suggested that Avalon’s narrow interpretation of the FHAA will
not be the end of the matter.232 “The type of claim made there (in Avalon) - that an
insurance underwriter may be required by the FHAA to modify the coverage it offers
if necessary for a person with a disability to secure a housing unit - may be expected
to be presented on a regular basis.”233 It may be expected on a regular basis in the
context of housing.234 What about in the context of health? FHAA mandates and
interpretations appear to have more understanding and awareness of the needs of
disabled people and the purpose of the legislation than ADA mandates and
interpretations have revealed.
V. A GROWING PROBLEM
In prior years, the ADA has been repeatedly brought into question regarding
discriminatory insurance practices, most recently regarding monetary caps on
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coverage for AIDS.235 As AIDS awareness rose, discrimination against those with
AIDS became an issue, and effectuated a demand for fairness in insurance policies.
While AIDS patients still encounter insurance discrimination, some federal courts
have invalidated insurance company caps on lifetime benefits for AIDS treatment.236
The mentally ill have since assumed the position of those suffering from AIDS.
Recently, like AIDS, with increasing awareness, discrimination against the mentally
disabled in health insurance has increased. This awareness will grow as the numbers
of those affected continues to rise. As indicated above, one in five Americans is
affected by mental illness, and more than five percent of American adults have a
serious mental illness so severe that it interferes with social functioning.237 These
numbers can be expected to rise in upcoming years.238
According to the 2000 Census, more than 35 million people in the United States
(12% of the total population) are over 65 years old.239 This number will continue to
rise dramatically when the “baby boomers” reach retirement age.240 In the first three
decades of the twenty-first century, the number of seniors will double, and the age
group will compose one-fifth rather that one-eighth of the overall population.241
Disability status is highly correlated with old age.242
Census data shows that, as people get older, their likelihood of having a disability
increases substantially.243 Between fifteen to twenty percent of elderly people in the
United States suffer from significant symptoms of mental illness.244 Also, the
highest suicide rate in America is among those sixty-five and older.245 Elderly
people lead the World Health Organization’s list of new cases of mental illness.
Between the likely increase in senior population, and an overall increase in
awareness of mental disabilities, the demand for equality and fairness in health
insurance for the mentally disabled is not only unlikely to retreat, but will likely
intensify.
VI. PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
The ADA was enacted to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities in light of
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historical tendency to isolate and segregate these individuals.246 Similarly, the
FHAA was a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end the unnecessary
exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream because
individuals with handicaps “have been denied housing because of misperceptions,
ignorance and outright prejudice.”247 These mandates are equal in their purpose,
rationale, and language, yet, their treatment of mentally versus physically disabled
persons has been vastly different. Under the FHAA, there truly is no distinction
between mental and physical illness with regard to attaining adequate, appropriate,
and fair housing. Accordingly, the ADA should not permit a distinction to be made
between mental and physical illness with regard to attaining adequate, appropriate,
and fair health insurance.
“Because a basic feature of our health insurance industry is classification based
on health, its relation to the nondiscrimination mandate of the ADA raises difficult
issues.”248 The safe harbor provision disturbs the statutory framework by exempting
traditional, discriminatory insurance practice from Title I constraints.249 It was not
included in the original bill but was later added “to reassure the insurance industry
and other covered entities that the ADA would not disturb current insurance
underwriting practices.”250 The safe harbor provision was inserted into the statute
“to curb the effect of the broad-reaching employment title on the provision of
employee insurance benefits.251
The inclusion of the safe harbor provision into the ADA appears to have been
motivated, at least in part, by the insurance lobby.252 According to an interview of a
member of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Subcommittee on Disabilities
Policy, in 1992, the insurance amendment (the safe harbor provision) was developed
in response to insurance group lobbying.253 The insurance industry actually assisted
the Committee in drafting the actual language of the provision, no hearings were
held on the insurance issue, and the legislative history does not document the initial
development of the language.254 These insurance provisions were included in the
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final version of the ADA which passed in both houses on July 17, 1990, and was
signed into law by President Bush nine days later.255
The power of the insurance lobby cannot be denied. An equally powerful lobby
of pro-consumer agencies, groups, and professions must be created to counter the
law which the self-interested insurance lobby created; the law that permits
discrimination. This lobby might include for example, NAMI (National Alliance for
the Mentally Ill), AAPD (American Association of People with Disabilities), AARP,
(American Association for Retired Persons), American Psychiatric Association,
Doctors, Nurses, Employer, or Unions. The lobby should support legislation
mandating equality in insurance benefits for the mentally ill by either amending or
reconstructing the safe harbor provision. Lobbying efforts should begin at the state
level, as the likelihood of successful legislation on a state level is greater than such
legislation on a federal level.
VII. CONCLUSION
Health insurance is a basic need for sustaining a healthy and productive life.
Americans rely on health insurance to provide them with medical care for the flu,
broken bones, giving birth, life threatening illnesses, and many other problems.
Americans who experience, for example, social withdrawal, inability to sleep,
delusions, hallucinations, extreme high and low moods, excessive fear or anxiety, or
thoughts of suicide, are not provided with medical care in an equal fashion. The
disparity between physical and mental health care coverage is reprehensible. The
insurance lobby interests, and the fact that mental illness remains misunderstood and
feared, explain the disparity.256 Insurance lobby efforts and public apprehension are
revealed through the narrow scope of the ADA with regard to health insurance.
“The goals of the ADA - for equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency - are beginning to shape our
national culture.”257 Those goals have not yet shaped our culture with respect to a
group of illnesses, which affect one in five Americans, mental illness. Mental health
care is important, and necessary; just as important and necessary as physical health
care or a home to live in. It is time for a change.
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